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Abstract 
In most developed countries, the provision of water is organized at a local level. The costs 
and tariffs vary significantly, even between adjacent water utilities. Such heterogeneity is an 
obvious indication of the sector’s overall inefficiency and stresses a need for institutional 
adjustments. We show that cooperation by water trade and the introduction of competition 
by  common  carriage  between  adjacent  utilities  are  valuable  alternatives  to  improve  the 
industry’s efficiency, even when mergers are not feasible. Because both approaches require 
the physical connection of neighboring networks, they may have similar effects. This paper 
analyzes and compares the relevant welfare gains and shows that production efficiency and 
retail prices may differ depending on the initial cost differential, the application of regulations 
and the distribution of bargaining power. Using a theoretical model, we show that at higher 
initial production cost differentials, welfare is higher under competitive conditions, even in a 
lowerbound benchmark case without any regulation. 
Keywords 
Water, Networks, Product-Market Competition, Trade, Bargaining. 
JEL Classification 
L95, L43, D21, Q25. 2 
1. Introduction 
 
The existing organization of piped water supply i n  E u r o p e  i s  v e r y  h e t e r o g e n e o u s .  I n  m o s t  
countries, water supply is organized at a local level. Historically, the communities are 
responsible for water supply systems, such as treatment and storage facilities or pipe networks, 
because water supply industry is widely viewed as a natural monopoly. In addition, local 
authorities choose the form of organization and the permitted degree of private sector 
participation. Due to these decentralized structures, water supply in most European countries 
is characterized by a high number of locally operating monopolies. Hence, there are more than 
6,500 local operators in Germany, approximately 8,000 in Italy, 3,000 in Switzerland and 2,000 
in Sweden (see EEB 2002, p. 24 - 28). Local operators often face very different marginal 
production costs due to differences in production scales, the use of different raw water 
resources, such as surface, ground or spring water, and different conditions of network 
infrastructure (see Correia and Kraemer 1997). As a result, retail prices vary significantly – 
even between adjacent water utilities (see Zschille et al. 2009). These cost and price 
differentials indicate overall production inefficiency for locally organized water supply 
industries. Hence, regulatory authorities or consumers in high-priced areas may ask for 
measures that improve productivity of supply. In fact, in 2009, the German Monopoly 
Commission strongly criticized regional price differentials and inefficiencies in the water 
supply and claimed institutional adjustments are needed (see Monopolkommission 2009). In its 
report, the authority proposed regulatory measures that increase the municipality’s incentives 
to merge neighboring water utilities. Moreover, the Monopoly Commission recommended 
outsourcing and competition to enhance efficiency of water supply. 
There are four prima facie ways to improve productive efficiency in the water sector: 
concentration, competition for the market, competition in the market and cooperation (see also 
Ludin et al., 2000). In fact, there has been a progressive concentration process in countries 
such as Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium, there are 109 waterworks, and 93% of total 
production is concentrated in the hands of only 10 companies. The Netherlands reduced the 
number of its government-owned water utilities from 111 to only 24 companies (see EEB 2002, 
p. 26). However, in many other countries, concentration is not a feasible or preferred 
opportunity due to political, legal or geographical restrictions. Only a few European countries, 
such as France, Italy, and UK (England and Wales), introduced some degree of competition in 
the water sector. France and, more recently, Italy implemented competition by the model of 
franchise bidding based on the idea of competition for the market. Furthermore, the German 
Monopoly Commission recommended in its report the application of franchise bidding to 
enhance the efficiency of water supply. However, simultaneously, it pointed to the danger of 3 
hold-up problems arising from long-term license contracts within the system of franchise 
bidding.  
Hence, in many cases, mergers and competition for the market may not be feasible. 
However, significant welfare gains can be achieved using the latter of the two alternatives. In a 
setup with profit-maximizing private companies, we show that welfare gains may be higher in 
the case of unregulated competition when assuming high efficiency differentials between water 
utilities. England and Wales have chosen a model of product market competition based on 
competition in the market. One main element of such competition is common carriage. The 
concept is based on the shared use of networks, similar to telecommunication, electricity or gas: 
the incumbent company is required to grant its competitors access to the network, which is 
assumed to be an essential facility. However, due to difficulties in the regulation of access 
prices and the physical characteristics of water, competition is expected to be weak and mainly 
local. In fact, competition by common carriage still plays a minor role in the English and Welsh 
water industries, even when the government tried to increase the relevance of competition by 
introducing a sector-specific law in 2005. An alternative way to enhance efficiency might be to 
increase cooperation between neighboring utilities. One main element of such a cooperation 
model is the exchange of treated water resources based on trade. Because water utilities often 
have differing qualities of raw water and therefore face different marginal production costs, 
trade between neighboring suppliers is expected to reduce total costs. In fact, water trade is 
already practiced in several countries. However, in most cases, trade is only used to balance 
peaks in demand, as the non-profit-oriented communal water utilities usually try to be as 
independent as possible. Hence, trade does not happen even when costs vary significantly 
between neighboring utilities, although a more consequent implementation of trade might 
induce extensive efficiency and, therefore, welfare gains.  
Obviously, such a regime of cross-border trade resembles the regime of competition by 
common carriage described above. The connection of networks can be used for water trade 
rather than for competition by common carriage. In both regimes, local and neighboring water 
suppliers connect their networks and exchange water. Both trade and competition cause the 
more efficient utilities to increase production volume and the less efficient utilities to reduce 
volume. One may question whether competition is useful because welfare gains are expected to 
be small due to the limited degree of competition and the emerging regulation costs. Using a 
game-theoretic model, we show that competition by common carriage induces stronger 
production incentives for the inefficient supplier. This implies that not only production 
efficiency but also the retail price tend to be lower than with cross-border trade. The net effect 
regarding welfare depends on the efficiency differential. At higher cost differentials, welfare is 
higher under common carriage, even in a lower-bound benchmark case without regulation of 
access charges. 4 
There is some literature addressing the issue of competition in the market by common 
carriage applied to the piped water sector. For instance, from economic and regulatory 
perspectives, Cowan (1993 and 1997), Webb and Erhardt (1998), Grout (2002), Klein (1996), 
Scheele (2000) and Sawkins (2001) discuss the opportunity for common carriage to be applied 
to the water sector. Due to technical constraints, regulation difficulties and barriers to entry, 
most authors indicate that common carriage is not a major opportunity to introduce effective 
rivalry into the water sector. Nevertheless, Sawkins (2001) concludes that common carriage 
remains the greatest competitive opportunity in the water sector. However, the main 
challenges are to reduce the regulatory burden and to lower entry barriers. Saal and Parker 
(2001) empirically analyze the efficiency effects of privatization and liberalization in England 
and Wales. They conclude that total factor productivity growth has not been improved after 
privatization. Additionally, privatization raised retail prices and water suppliers’ profits. 
However, Saal and Parker analyze the post privatization period of 1990-1999, when 
competition by common carriage still played a minor role. Using a game-theoretic model, 
Foellmi and Meister (2005) analyze potential efficiency gains of common carriage. They argue 
that competition may increase efficiency even in a “worst case” scenario in which regulation is 
absent. The effects of different access price regulations were analyzed by Hern (2001). He 
concluded that the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) is a superior approach for the 
development of efficient competition in the specific circumstances of the UK water industry. 
The role of regulation in practice was also highlighted by a recent market report from the 
Office of Water Services (Ofwat), which is the regulator for the English and Welsh water 
industry. Ofwat, which applies a version of ECPR, recommends accounting separation of the 
contestable markets from the natural monopoly to improve the efficiency of regulation (Ofwat 
2008).  
A wide range of literature is related to trade of water rights. For instance, Hearne and 
Easter (1997) describe gains from the trading of water rights in Chile, Rosengrant and 
Binswanger (1994) present potential efficiency gains in developing countries, Pigram (1993) 
analyzes property rights and water markets in Australia, and Becker (1995) discusses potential 
gains from trade in Israel. However, few authors have analyzed trade related to spot water 
markets. Howitt (1998) shows that spot markets are better than water rights markets for 
stabilizing water availability. Calatrava and Garrido (2005) consider the risk dimension of 
water markets under conditions of uncertain water supply. They show that spot water markets 
may allow farmers to reduce their risk exposure caused by an unstable water supply. 
Additionally, they show that centralized water markets lead to more efficient allocation and 
resource use than decentralized markets. Carey and Zilberman (2002) investigate farmers’ 
investments into irrigation technology under conditions of uncertainty and conclude that 
farmers with access to a spot water market may delay investment. Due to price uncertainty, 5 
the option to delay investment has a positive value, and thus, farmers will not invest until the 
expected present value of investment sufficiently exceeds the cost of investment. There is some 
literature analyzing bargaining processes and bargaining power in water markets: Kajisa and 
Sakurai (2000) examine water markets in India, and Meinzen-Dick (1997) examines 
groundwater markets in Pakistan. However, this literature addresses water trade related to 
agricultural issues in particular, while our paper rather discusses trade between neighboring 
water utilities that offer water services to final customers, such as households or industry. 
Newbery (1999) introduces a model that combines competition and trade in the network 
industry. Two suppliers compete in a single downstream gas market. Both pay a fee for using 
the network, which connects the market to the upstream gas producers. Newbery shows that if 
the suppliers can trade capacity rights amongst each other, they can use the price of these 
rights to support the joint profit-maximizing downstream price. However, such a setting is not 
feasible in the piped water market with vertically integrated water utilities. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no literature analyzing the comparison of trade and competition between 
local water utilities.  
Section 2 evaluates the reasons for the above-mentioned productivity differentials and 
discusses the relevant approaches to enhance efficiency. Additionally, the section provides 
evidence on competition and trade in the European water market. In Section 3, we set up a 
general model that considers the physical restrictions in the water sector, the difficulties of 
regulation and varying bargaining power to analyze the effects of competition and trade. We 
then compare the effects of competition and trade on productive efficiency, retail prices and 
welfare, and the distribution of profits between firms. In Section 4, we consider an example 
with linear demand and constant marginal costs. In the same section, we investigate the effects 
of regulation of access prices on the one hand and regulation of retail prices on the other. In 
Section 5, we present a simulation of the model. It shows that the result of the linear case holds 
as well for more general demand and cost functions: welfare tends always to be higher with 
trade because the productive efficiency effect dominates. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Improving efficiency of water supply  
 
2.1 Sources of efficiency differentials  
In many countries, costs and tariffs of water supply differ significantly. Renzetti (1992) 
estimates the marginal costs of waterworks in Vancouver range from $ 0.53 to $ 0.85 per cubic 
meter. Such differences in costs obviously induce price differentials. For example, in France, 
tariffs varied between 0.42 FF and 10.92 FF per cubic meter (see Correia and Kraemer 1997). 
Current tariffs in Germany vary between 0.5 and 4 Euros (see von Hirschhausen 2009). The 6 
significant cost and price differentials may lead us to believe there is inefficiency in the water 
supply. Hence, before evaluating approaches that address the increase of water supply 
efficiency, it is useful to discuss the reason for the vast cost and price differentials. Walter et al. 
(2009) offer a broad literature overview on the issue of efficiency of the water supply. The 
ownership structure of water utilities does not clearly influence the level of productivity. There 
is no clear empirical evidence of whether private or public ownership matters for efficiency. 
Hence, more useful is the analysis of structural and quality variables on the one hand and 
economies of scale, density and scope on the other.  
Structural variables may be water losses and the quality of the used raw water. One 
can assume that these two variables strongly stick together, as water losses tend to be more 
costly when using a more complex and expensive treatment procedure. The use of spring water 
usually requires no treatment at all and is therefore less expensive than ground or surface 
water. In particular, the surface water resources need extensive treatment, such as screening, 
flocculation, clarification, filtration, the addition of chemicals and the use of ultraviolet light. 
Hence, marginal costs vary significantly between water suppliers, depending on the 
availability of high- or low-quality raw water resources. The empirical analysis of Zschille et al. 
(2009) strongly supports such an impact of these two structural variables in the German water 
market. The result is consistent with an older analysis of Dwr Cymru Welsh Water (1999) that 
shows water supplier’s operative costs to be mainly influenced by the complexity of water 
treatment, a finding also confirmed by Antonioli and Filippini (2001). 
Several studies illustrate the existence of economies of scale and scope. Economies of 
scale, or rising profits with increasing size, are shown by Garcia and Thomas (2001) for France, 
Garcia et al. (2007) for the US and Filippini et al. (2008) for Slovenia. However, some studies 
also show diseconomies of scale, e.g., Saal and Parker (2005) for the UK and Mizutani and 
Urakami (2001) for Japan, implying that the firm size is too large. In fact, even when water 
utilities costs are mainly fixed, the size of scale economies is rather limited. Mergers of water 
utilities may induce cost savings in administration, sourcing or water treatment. However, the 
vast investment and maintenance costs related to the pipe network cannot significantly be 
reduced. Antonioli and Filippini (2001) show that there is no evidence that a larger service area 
results in any scale economies in water distribution. They conclude that a merger between two 
companies with adjacent service areas does not substantially decrease average costs. This is 
due to the fact that the average network cost is greatly determined by the influence of the 
population density, as documented by the studies analyzed by Walter et al. (2009). Economies 
of density measure differences in costs when output or production increase while holding the 
other variables, such as the supply territory, constant. Strongly related to the concept of 
economies of scale are economies of scope. They measure cost advantages when running the 
water supply business together with other network services, such as wastewater, electricity, 7 
gas and telecommunications. Even though the related literature is limited, there are 
indications of the existence of economies of scope. The sources of cost savings may be synergies 
in administration on the one hand and civil works on the other.  
The analysis above illustrates that the merger of neighboring water utilities may not be 
the only and preferred strategy to increase efficiency in the water supply. First, it may hinder 
local utilities from harvesting the fruits of their multi-utility approaches. By merging 
neighboring water utilities into supra-regional or even national players, the use of local 
economies of scope between the communal suppliers of network services can be significantly 
restricted. Otherwise, the whole set of local water, wastewater and gas suppliers should be 
merged into one large firm to take advantage of economies of scale and scope. However, in 
many cases, this would not be realistic or would simply be too complex. Additionally, in many 
countries where water supply is integrated into the municipalities’ organizational structure, 
political and legal restrictions hinder the merger of neighboring utilities.  
Second, there are alternative strategies to increase efficiency in the water supply. As is 
shown above, the main sources of productivity differences are the use of different quality levels 
of raw water and the related treatment costs. Clearly, the reduction of these costs requires a 
physical connection of water utilities’ pipe networks: Utilities with higher-quality raw water or 
more efficient treatment facilities should supply a greater portion of consumers, while the more 
expensive supplier should reduce its production share. Of course, such an approach would not 
require any merger between the connected water supply firms. Rather, it may be reached by 
either competition in the market or cooperation by trade. The following two subsections 
elaborate in more detail. 
 
2.2 Competition in the Market 
 
Thus far, product market competition, or competition in the piped water market, has only been 
introduced in England and Wales. After the entire privatization of water service companies in 
1989, competition in the market was established through three basic channels (see Scheele, 
2000 or Kurukulasuriya, 2001): inset appointments, cross-border competition and common 
carriage. Inset appointments – licenses issued by Ofwat – allow new entrants to supply 
customers in a defined geographical area. However, Ofwat initially limited the permission of 
inset appointments for sites that were not already connected and that were more than 30 
meters away from the local water supplier’s pipe network. Today, inset appointments are 
available for new customers (not yet connected) or major customers (consuming more than 
100,000 m3 per year). Moreover, customers at every scale can change their supplier, provided 
that their previous supplier agrees to the change (see Scheele, 2000, p. 14). Cross-border 
competition allows customers that are located at the border of a supply area to purchase water 8 
from an existing neighboring utility. Finally, common carriage refers to the shared use of 
assets, as it would be uneconomical for a competitor to duplicate the provision of large assets, 
such as the pipe network. The competition model allows market entrants with their own water 
resources and/or treatment facilities to enter the market and use the incumbent’s network to 
supply customers. However, in many cases, market entrance is assumed to be difficult because 
new water rights are not locally traded and/or investments into new treatment facilities are 
immense. Alternatively, treated water can be moved between areas through existing or new 
connections between local networks (see also Ofwat 2008, p. 10 and 66). Then, competition 
occurs through the interconnection of existing neighboring water supply companies: the former 
monopolists connect their water networks to allow each other access to their distribution pipes 
– analogous to well-established network-access regimes in telecommunication, electricity or gas 
(see BMWi 2001, p. 11-28). Hence, market entrance is assured through (mutual) network 
access. Providing network access allows a network owner to charge an access fee to its 
competitor – analogous to the access fees in the telecommunication sector.  
Basically, the Competition Act 1998 (which generally determines access to essential 
facilities) has been a legal basis for the introduction of competition by common carriage. 
However, the government in England and Wales tried to strengthen the role of common 
carriage. In 2002, Ofwat issued guidance on the development of access codes. The guidelines 
defined standards of behavior for the companies and new entrants in their agreements about 
common carriage and helped companies to avoid breaching the Competition Act. Additionally, 
in 2005, a sector-specific law (Water Act 2003) came into effect. It was intended to give new 
momentum to the development of product market competition through common carriage. It 
introduced a formal regime of water supply licensing (WSL), defined the threshold for 
contestability (non-household customers with a consumption of more than 50 ML/year) and 
provided a detailed framework for access. In this context, the act also defines the principles of 
access price calculation. Based on the law, Ofwat proposed a price formula that is a version of 
the well-known Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) (see Conti 2004).  
However, in practice, competition still plays a minor role in the water industry of 
England and Wales (see also Ofwat 2008, p. 3). None of the three mentioned forms of 
competition has developed much. The regulation of retail prices by price cap and elements of 
yardstick competition are of higher importance. In fact, due to the specific technical issues in 
the water sector, product market competition by common carriage is not expected to be as 
effective as it would be in the telecommunication or electricity industries (see BMWi 2001, p. 
24). In contrast to telecommunication or electricity networks, water networks are more local 
than national because there are limitations to network connection due to specific technical 
aspects of the water sector. On the one hand, there are limitations to mixing different water 
qualities, as it raises the possibility of leaching, corrosion of pipes, sedimentation and 9 
suspension of particles and affects microbial quality (see Kurukulasauiya 2001, p. 24). On the 
other hand, there are limitations to transport. In contrast to electricity, the transportation of 
water causes significant marginal costs due to pumping requirements. Furthermore, 
transportation over long distances affects the quality of the water in a negative way (see BMWi 
2001, p. 24). To sum up, due to these limitations, competition by common carriage tends to 
occur only at a regional or even local level. 
Furthermore, competition in the water sector can be restricted by the market power of 
incumbents (see also Ofwat 2008, p. 65). They can defend their monopoly positions by charging 
high access prices; effective regulation of access charges in the water sector is very complex, as 
the costs of using water pipe networks depend on various technical aspects such as age or 
material of pipes, pumping requirements and water pressure. In addition, these costs vary 
significantly between local networks. Hence, the access charges would have to be set in an 
individual and local manner, which is different from the telecommunications industry. Simon 
Cowan (1997, p. 91) argues that the regulatory burden of assessing access prices for different 
companies’ networks is large. Indeed, the regulator Ofwat does not explicitly regulate access 
charges ex ante. It rather defines general terms for the calculation of access prices. On the 
basis of the guidance, water companies have to publish their specific access codes, including 
indicative or standard prices for access. Ofwat requires companies not to set indicative prices 
that are unrealistically high to deter entrants (see Ofwat 2002, p. 20-22). The extensive 
complexity of regulation is also highlighted by Sawkins (2001), who mentions that the amount 
of information gathered for monitoring purposes has grown unremittingly as the suite of 
performance indicators has expanded. Based on these circumstances, the effectiveness of 
regulation and competition in the market is doubtful. The World Bank even questions whether 
efficiency gains from competition outweigh the costs (see Webb and Ehrhardt 1998, p. 5). Aside 
from these provisos against the effectiveness of competition in the market, there is political 
opposition to the introduction of any kind of competition and privatization in the piped water 
sector. There is fear that private companies would rather optimize short-term profits than long-
term welfare (see, for instance, BMWi 2001). Before 2000, the European Community (EC) 
excluded the water industry from its competition law – in contrast to other network utilities, 
such as postal services, gas and electricity. Additionally, the EC defined in its Water 
Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC): “Water is not a commercial product like any 
other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such (see 
European Commission 2009).” The Water Framework Directive does not include any guidelines 






Cross-border trade between neighboring water suppliers is more common than competition by 
access. Treated water is exchanged between independent neighboring water utilities or, more 
commonly, between utilities that are members of partnerships of convenience (PC), which are 
called Zweckverbaende in Germany. PCs are voluntary associations between independent 
municipalities that intend to fulfill a certain public task, such as water supply or wastewater 
disposal, as a collective. Approximately 17% of German water suppliers are organized in PCs 
(see BGW 1999). According to Ludin et al. (2000), PCs are mainly motivated by insufficient 
enterprise scales, on the one hand, and technical aspects, such as hydrologic and hydrogeologic 
conditions, on the other hand. A PC has a self-contained legal form of organization and acts as 
public corporation. Hence, in most cases, it describes a merger of neighboring water utilities 
rather than trade between independent water suppliers. However, purer forms of water trade 
between utilities also exist. German water suppliers with extended treatment capacities, such 
as Bodenseewasserversorgung, Harzwasserwerke or Gelsenwasser, sell water to neighboring or 
even distant water utilities. Water trade between utilities is also practiced in other countries, 
including Switzerland. Switzerland’s largest water supplier is the Zurich water utility (WVZ). 
It provides about 460,000 inhabitants of the Zurich city directly; furthermore, it sells water to 
contractual partners, represented by 67 communities in the nearer region of Zurich with an 
additional 420,000 inhabitants.  The latter communities have their own local public water 
suppliers. Such a large number of partners might be surprising because mixing different water 
qualities usually requires extensive coordination efforts. However, none of the WVZ’s partners 
use complex treatment technologies. They exclusively use spring or ground water and do not 
need the addition of any chemicals. Mixing their water with the WVZ’s treated water is 
therefore unproblematic and requires only a minimum level of coordination effort. 
However, only in the case of demand peaks do they buy treated water from the WVZ 
that disposes of extended treatment capacities due to the use of surface water. The relevant 
price is based on costs and is calculated identically for each partner. Approximately 20% of 
WVZ’s total water production is sold to contractual partners (see WVZ 2009). Obviously, the 
same specific technical issues restrict the extension of trade and product market competition. 
Limitations of mixing different water qualities, extensive coordination requirements for the 
exchange of treated water and diseconomies of scales due to pumping requirements and quality 





3 A Model of Competition and Trade 
 
As we explained above both competition and trade are expected to occur on a regional or even 
local level. The above mentioned specifications in the water industry limit the number of 
networks that can be connected in order to exchange water. To keep the following analysis 
simple, we assume a network connection of only two neighbouring utilities. And since 
favourable raw water resources such as spring and groundwater are limited and the 
construction of new treatment facilities causes high sunk costs, we exclude the entrance of new 
water suppliers and focus only existing water utilities. Figure 1 describes the basic setting of 
the model. By connecting their networks 1 and 2, two suppliers A and B are able to exchange 
treated water. The vertically integrated suppliers A and B can be asymmetric. Depending on 
production scale and the quality of raw water resources used, water supplier’s marginal costs 
may differ significantly – even between neighbouring water suppliers (see above). Since water 
supply is very capital intensive, we assume that utilities choose rather quantities and 
capacities than prices. Our model is therefore based on a Cournot competition. And since the 
treated water of both suppliers is mixed within the water pipe system, we assume homogenous 
goods. Due to water treatment and pumping requirements the production of water causes 
variable costs Cj(), j  A, B. Such variable cost may include additional expenditures related 
to billing, metering and other administration cost. Fixed costs such as network investment and 
maintenance costs are omitted since they are irrelevant for the optimisation problem under 
concern. Without loosing generality we assume the more efficient utility B to have lower 
marginal treatment costs than utility A.  
 
Figure 1 : Connection of two neighbouring water networks 
 
In order to ease the exposition, marginal costs of the (efficient) supplier B are equal to 
cB and constant. Instead, supplier A faces increasing marginal costs, CA’(0) > cB and CA’’  0. 
The assumption of increasing marginal costs is appropriate for utilities facing relevant capacity 
constraints because of the production structure in the water industry. Water supplier’s 
operative costs are mainly influenced by the complexity of water treatment. In order to 
minimise treatment costs, utilities firstly use raw water resources of high quality such as 
spring water. To overcome capacity constraints they use further resources with poorer quality 
and therefore higher treatment requirements such as groundwater or surface water. Due to 
this reasoning, marginal costs of drinking water production are obviously increasing in output. 
According to our assumptions, the more efficient utility B does not face relevant capacity 
constraints due to sufficient availability of high quality raw water resources. The introduction 12 
of increasing marginal costs for B does not change the results in network 1 qualitatively. 
However, the analysis would be more complex since we would have to consider price and 
quantity changes in both networks 1 and 2 (see also Foellmi and Meister, 2005). Further, we 
only allow for linear access and trade prices. Of course the analysis could be extended to a non-
linear pricing regime. The qualitative predictions of the model remain the same. However, the 
reader would obtain the well known result that highest possible production efficiency can be 
achieved (see Foellmi and Meister, 2005). Additionally, we consider two profit-maximising 
water utilities in both competition and trade. Instead, we could assume that the utilities are 
welfare-maximising. However, this would not change the results fundamentally. For a broader 
analysis of common carriage in mixed oligopolies where water utilities maximise profits and/or 




Supplier A with higher marginal costs generates earnings in two different ways: Selling water 
to customers connected to the own network and levying an access charge. It can be shown 
(Foellmi and Meister, 2005) that the inefficient supplier will not sell water to customers 
connected to the low-cost-competitor’s network. The profit of a supplier A is given as follows: 
 
) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A A B A B A A q C q a q q q p            (1) 
 
where  p1 denotes the retail prices in market 1. Q1A stands for the quantity of sold water 
produced by A to customers connected to network 1, q1B stands for the quantity of sold water 
produced by B to customers connected to network 1. Utility A levies an access charge which 
consists of a variable access price a1. As there is no regulation, A is free to set the access 
charge. And as B’s marginal costs are constant, its decision problem can be fully described by 
considering its profit from market 1. Such profit is given as follows:  
 
B B B B B A B q c q a q q q p 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) (            (2) 
 
The model consists of two stages. In a first stage supplier A chooses the access prices a1. 
Given the access charge A and B simultaneously set production quantities q1A and q1B in the 
second stage. Obviously, A would be able to prevent any competition by charging extensive 
high access charges in the first stage. On the second stage A and B would choose q2A 
respectively q1B equal to zero – access would not take place. Allowing common carriage would 
not have any positive welfare effects compared to a situation, where two independent 13 
monopolists act in their own markets. However, it can be shown (see Foellmi and Meister, 
2005), that the inefficient utility A voluntarily opens its network to the low-cost competitor B. 
In order to compare welfare between the competition and the trade regime we have to analyse 
the relevant effects on retail prices and production efficiency. We solve the model by backwards 
induction. Given a1, the firms choose their quantities q1A and q1B.: 
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A  .     (5) 
 
As usual the optimal access price depends on the quantity reaction of B, captured by the 
1 1 /da dq B  term. Considering the term p1q1A , A perceives that a reduction of q1B increases prices 
in the retail market. Note that the quantity reaction of A does not affect marginal profits 
because of the Envelope theorem. The quantity reaction of B can be determined by 
differentiation of equations (3) and (4), whereas the former only has to taken into consideration 
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B        if      q1A = 0      (6). 
 
We assume that the reaction curves (in quantities) are falling, so  0 ' ' ' 1 1 1  p p q j . We note that 
the absolute value  1 1 /da dq B  is larger when q1A > 0 than for the case q1A = 0. The quantity 
reaction of B is therefore stronger when A produces. This result is due to the strategic 
complementarity of quantities. An increase in a1 reduces q1B (direct effect). This leads in turn to 
an increase in the quantity of the competitor q1A, which induces B to produce even less (indirect 14 
effect). We first analyse p1 under the assumption that utility A still produces a positive amount 
of water itself. By using equation (6) in (5), solving it for a1 and inserting the result into (4) we 
can derive the relevant retail price in market 1.  
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if      q1A > 0      and where q1 = q1A + q1B.  
 
Equation (7) only holds if q1A > 0, or equivalently, the implied value of p1 is larger than  ) 0 ( ' A C . 
Considering the regularity assumptions above, an increase in  ) 0 ( ' A C  implies a reduction of q1A. 
According to equation (3) A stops the own production exactly where  ) 0 ( ' 1 A C p  . In this case, A 
becomes a pure network operator. If marginal costs  ) 0 ( ' A C  increase further it is optimal for A 
to increase the access fee a1 such that the retail price p1 rises (but p1 increases less than  ) 0 ( ' A C  
as our regularity assumptions guarantee uniqueness). Since q1A = 0 the above mentioned 
strategic effect is no longer existent. Hence it is optimal for A to raise a1 since B will reduce its 
engagement in market 1 less strongly. Taken together, the retail price p1 is smaller than or 
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In both cases the high-cost utility A reduces own production (if it was not already zero 
before) and the low-cost utility B increases production, so the differential of A’s and B’s 
marginal costs diminishes and overall efficiency in the water market increases. Due to 
increasing marginal production costs in market 1 the introduction of competition reduces retail 
prices and raises sold water volume. Obviously welfare must be higher than in the status quo, 
where the two utilities act as independent monopolists. However, since A levies a positive 
linear access price a1, welfare is negatively affected by a double marginalisation problem. In its 
decisions about quantities and therefore prices utility B faces relevant marginal costs of (cB + 
a1). Hence B will limit its engagement q1B in market 1 below the socially optimal amount, 
which would guarantee efficiency of production. In fact if B were a monopolist in market 1, 
according to the Amoroso Robinson equation he would set B B c q p p    1 1 1 ' . This is smaller than 
p1 in equation (8) since  ) 0 ( '
'
1 1 1 1 A B B C a p c q p       according to equation (4) and since 
B B B B B B c p p q q p q c q p        ) ' 2 ' ' ( ' ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  since  0 ' 2 ' ' 1 1 1   p p q B  according to equation (6). 15 
In both cases supplier A and B share the additional profit resulting from the 
introduction of competition. In our general analysis we forbear from doing a more detailed 





We have shown that introducing product market competition between neighbouring water 
utilities can lead to significant efficiency and therefore welfare gains in the water industry. 
However, one could argue that similar effects could result from introducing unregulated cross 
border trade amongst neighbouring utilities. It is obvious that a high cost utility A has 
incentives to buy treated water from the more efficient utility B that faces lower marginal costs 
of water treatment. Buying inexpensive water from B allows A to reduce own water treatment 
respectively to reduce the use of inferior raw water resources and therefore cost of production. 
B on the other side can earn additional profit by these trading activities. Due to the constant 
marginal costs cB the decision problem of B reduces to the analysis of its trading activities. The 
reduced profit is given by:  
 
) ( ) ( T T B T T T B p q c p p q          (9), 
 
where qT stands for the quantity of water that B sells to A and pT describes the trade price. A 
on the other side derives revenues solely from selling water to customers located in network 1. 
Own production of A is now denoted by qA to avoid confusion with the competition case. A’s 
profit can therefore be defined as follows:  
 
T T A A T A A q p q C q q q p      ) ( ) )( ( 1 1       (10), 
 
where q1 = qA + qT. Cross border trade implies three different market places: On the one side 
the retail markets 1 and 2, where the utilities act as monopolists, and on the other side the 
wholesale market for treated water resources. The latter market is characterised by a bilateral 
monopoly. One seller and one buyer bargain over the trade price and quantity and therefore 
the allocation of gains from trade (which are positive because marginal costs of A are higher 
than those of B). We assume that the equilibrium amount of trade is the outcome of a Nash 
bargaining between A and B with exogenously given bargaining power. As our model describes 
trade between fully informed but unequal players the relevant bargaining power of the two 
parties can be different. There are several empirical studies addressing the issue of bargaining 
power in bilateral monopolies (e.g. Chipty and Snyder, 1999, Kauf, 1999, Kajisa and Sakurai, 16 
2000). Kajisa and Sakurai analyse it for water trade in the agrarian sector in India. According 
to their analysis seller’s power is positively correlated with its physical capital respectively 
total amount of investment into the water production facilities. They also found some empirical 
evidence in support of a weak sellers’ bargaining position in the Indian water market. Social 
constraints may hinder sellers to enjoy unacceptable amounts of excess profits. In order to 
make the impact of different bargaining power apparent, we focus in the following analysis the 
two polar cases, where only the seller respectively the buyer has the entire bargaining power.  
 
3.2.1 Full Bargaining Power of Utility B  
 
We first consider the perhaps more intuitive case where the more efficient utility B has the 
entire bargaining power on the wholesale market. Seller B defines the relevant trade price and 
makes a “take it or leave it” offer to utility A. Obviously B sets a trade price that maximises its 
profit from trading activities described by equation (9). Maximization of B’s trade profit with 
respect to pT yields to the following first order condition: 
 















      (11). 
 
In order to define  T T p q   / which describes the slope of A’s demand function for treated water 
on a trading market we need to analyse its profit, which is described by equation (10). 
Maximization of A’s profit with respect to qA and qT yields the following first order conditions: 
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In case- of utility A decides to produce itself a positive amount of water (qA > 0) the right hand 
side of equation (12) is zero. Total differentiation of (12) and (13) and applying Cramer’s rule 
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       (14)  if     qA > 0 
 
where MRA =  1 / q A     denotes A’s marginal revenues (∂MRA / ∂q1 < 0). Note that the above 
defined slope of the demand curve is only valid when utility A produces water as well (qA > 0). 
If CA’(0) exceeds pT, A gives up own production and becomes a pure water broker. In this case A 
purchases the entire amount of water which is necessary to cover demand in market 1. 
Obviously this can happen when A is very inefficient compared to B. In order to define now the 
slope of the demand curve we can neglect equation (12), since qA = 0. Total differentiation of 
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      (15)      if     qA = 0 . 
 
The demand curve is less elastic after utility A decides to stop own production (qA = 0), since 
the right hand side of equation (15) is less negative than the right hand side of (15). A is 
therefore more sensitive to changes in pT when it still produces itself (qA > 0). If A still produces 
own water, an increasing trade price pT would make A expand its own production – A would 
substitute qT by qA. A higher CA’’ reduces A’s opportunities to substitute qT by qA since own 
water production would be too costly. A steeper marginal cost curve reduces therefore price 
elasticity of demand. 
 
Figure 2: Demand for traded water 
 
A decides to stop own production when  ) 0 ( ' A C > pT. In this case own production is more 
expensive than purchasing water from the neighbouring utility B. As mentioned above, the 
demand curve changes its slope depending whether A produces a positive amount of water or 
not (see Figure 2). The relevant bend in the demand curve for traded water must therefore be 
at a trade price pT =  ) 0 ( ' A C .  
 
3.2.1.1 Competition versus trade 
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After defining A’s demand curve we are able to compare the trade regime with the competition 
regime. In order to carry out the comparison for all parameter values, it turns out useful to 
separate the cases whether – for both regimes – A keeps own water production or gives it up 
completely. The sign of the welfare comparisons may be different depending on whether A 
produces or not. The possible outcomes when comparing trade with competition are given in 
the following Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Different Marginal Cost Scenarios 
 
To read Table 1 note that we reduce A’s marginal costs as we move from case 1 to case 
3. We divide case 1 in 1a and 1b to account for the discrete change in  1 1 /da dq B  which occurs at 
q1A = 0 (see equation (6)). We divide case 2 in 2a and 2b in order to consider different trade 
prices due to the bend in the demand curve for traded water (see Figure 2). The equilibrium 
values for the retail price in market 1 and the trade price on the wholesale market are denoted 
by  1 ˆ p  and  T p ˆ , respectively. Of course, prices depend on ' A C in general. However it is easy to see 
that the case ordering in Table 1 is still applicable. Let us start in case 1 where CA’(0) is high. 
When CA’(0) decreases, 
1 ˆ p  remains fixed as long as qA = q1A = 0. When we enter Case 2a – 
where q1A > 0 – price p1 begins to fall. However it cannot fall below CA’(0)  again. Otherwise A 
would choose q1A = 0 and p1 would be equal to that in case 1. But this price is higher than CA’(0) 
contradicting our assumption. For case 2b and 3 the argument is analogous. 
According to equation (3) in the competition regime, utility A  produces a positive 
amount of water if and only if  ) 0 ( ' ˆ1 A C p  . With trade, equations (13) and (12) apply; we see 
that A produces only if  1 ˆ ˆ p pT   respectively  T A p C ˆ ) 0 ( '   where  1 ˆ ˆ p pT  . Because of this double 
marginalisation argument A’s incentives to produce a positive amount of water are stronger in 
case of competition.  
We start analysing case 1a where A decides to give up completely its own production. 
From equation (8) we know that the retail price is given by: 
 
B B B c p p q q p     ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1 1 1       (16) 
 
In the trade regime we apply equations (14) and (15) in (11) to get 
 
B T T c p p q q p     ) ' 3 ' ' ( 1 1 1       (17). 
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Proposition 1: In case 1a retail price, production efficiency and resulting welfare are equal in 
the trade and competition regime. 
Proof: Equations (16) and (17) imply q1B = qT since q1A = qA = 0. As water is produced within the 
efficient utility B only, the production costs and thus welfare are equal for both regimes.  
 
When  ) 0 ( ' A C  equals the retail price p1 given by (16), we enter case 1b. Now, the retail 
price is given by  ) 0 ( ' A C  (see equation (8)). Obviously p1 in the competition regime begins to 
fall, as  ) 0 ( ' A C falls further. However, the lower retail price implies a lower access price than in 
case 1a. This is an interesting result: A’s profit declines when he becomes more efficient. The 
reason is that A cannot credibly commit not to produce on his own at the second stage when he 
would set the access price too high. The thread that A will start own production makes B’s 
quantity reaction to an access price change more elastic which implies that A will set lower 
access prices in equilibrium. This implies that in case 1b welfare is strictly higher in the 
competition regime. Prices are lower and production is still efficient since only B produces. 
 
Proposition 2: In case 1b welfare is always higher in the competition regime. 
Proof: The reduced level of  ) 0 ( ' A C  implies a lower retail and access price in the competition 
regime compared to case 1a. However, since q1A = 0 production efficiency is the same. In the 
trade regime nothing changes to case 1a. 
 
Case 2a compares the competition regime, where A keeps (parts of) its own production, to the 
trade regime, where A completely gives up its water production. The formulae for the trade 
regime are the same for both cases 1 and 2a, so equa tion (1 7) still h olds . However, in the 
competition regime the retail price is given by equation (7). It is shown in proposition 3 that the 
retail price is always lower in the competition regime. The intuition can be grasped as follows: 
in case of trade only one monopolistic firm is present in market 1 (in case 2). In the access 
regime the retail price tends to be lower since there are two utilities engaged in Cournot 
competition and hence do not take the change in their competitor’s profits into account when 
setting their quantities. However, even when prices are lower in the competition regime, 
welfare could still be higher with trade. The reason is higher production efficiency with trade. 
In the competition regime the inefficient utility produces a positive amount of water – as a 
result average production costs must be higher than in the trade regime. Therefore competition 
tends to work better when A’s marginal cost are relatively high – because in such a case A’s 
own production stays small (or equals zero as in case 1b). In fact our simulations in section 5 
show that the productive efficiency effect dominates the consumer surplus effect when the 
marginal cost differential between A and B is smaller ceteris paribus. 20 
 
Proposition 3: For case 2a the welfare comparison is ambiguous. The retail price p1 is always 
lower under competition, but production efficiency is higher in the trade regime. 
Proof: The price in the case 2a is strictly lower for the competition case. The right hand side of 
(7) is strictly lower than that of (17) because  0 ' ' ' 1 1 1  p p q j . 
 
Obviously, from a consumer’s viewpoint competition is always more favourable, since consumer 
surplus is determined by the level of the retail price p1.  
Since cases 2b and 3 do not raise any qualitatively new issues, we keep their discussion 
short. The only distinctive feature is that – compared to the competition regime – the relative 
prices with trade are lower than in cases 1 and 2a. In case 2b the relative difference between 
) 0 ( ' A C  and cB is small enough such that the marginal costs of B cross the marginal revenue 
curve at the vertical segment (see Figure 2). Hence pT =  ) 0 ( ' A C . Therefore A maximises its 
profits similar to an independent monopolist facing constant marginal costs pT. The relevant 
retail price in the trade regime reads now: 
 
' ) 0 ( ' 1 1 p q C p T A           (18) 
 
Obviously this price lies between the trade price of the trade regime in case 2a and 3. In Case 3 
both utilities keep their water production. The demand curve for water on the trade market is 
now defined by equation (14). Using equations (11), (13) and (14) we derive price p1 in the trade 
regime  
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where   1 ) ' ' ' 2 ( ) ( ' ' / ) ( ' ' 1 1 1     p q p q C q C A A A A  . Since q1  > q A the retail price p1 in the trade 
regime tends to be smaller than in cases 1 and 2a. This result induces that the relative 
performance of the trade regime in case 3 tends to be more advantageous than in 2a. However, 
it is still not obvious whether p1 is lower than in the competition regime. The price differential 
is now determined both by the curvature of the demand and the value of    A q q   ) 1 ( 1 . To sum 
up, the trade regime performs “better” in comparison to the competition regime when A’s 
marginal costs are at lower levels. The reason is that the price setting possibilities for B are 
now limited which dampens the double marginalisation effect of trade pricing.  
Independent from the curvature of the demand curve, production efficiency in the trade 
regime is still higher although the inefficient utility A produces also in the trade regime when 
case 3 is relevant. However, and as mentioned above, A’s incentives to produce a positive 21 
amount of water are always stronger under competition than under trade. The amount of 
traded water must therefore be higher than the amount of water sold by B through access, qT > 
q1B. This means that the more efficient utility B produces in the trade regime a higher part of 
the entire water quantities sold in market 1 and 2. Total production costs are therefore lower 
than in the competition regime. 
Apart from the effects regarding retail price and efficiency it is worth mentioning the 
distribution of profits. The roles of A and B differ fundamentally in the competition and trade 
regime. In the trade regime the less efficient utility A acts as a downstream monopolist while 
in the competition regime A is an upstream monopolist. For most demand functions an 
upstream monopolist is able to skim the main part of the overall profit – e.g. two thirds in case 
of a linear demand function. 
 
3.2.2 Full Bargaining Power of Utility A 
 
Let us now analyse the other polar case where less efficient utility A has the entire bargaining 
power on the wholesale market. This means the buyer A defines the relevant trade price and 
makes a “take it or leave it” offer to utility B. Having the entire bargaining power utility A 
maximises its own profit represented by equation (9) subject to B’s participation constraint 
denoted by  T B T T q c q p  . Obviously A will offer a trade price pT = cB. Offering a higher trade 
price would reduce A’s profit since it causes higher costs, offering a smaller trade price would 
violate B’s participation constraint. In such a setting B’s marginal cost curve represents the 
supply curve on the wholesale market for treated water. Of course this is a well-known result 
which goes back at least to Tintner (1939) and Morgan (1949).  
The equilibrium production structure is quickly determined. A reduces its own water 
production qA until CA’ is equal to pT = cB. If  ) 0 ( ' A C  exceeds pT, A gives up own production and 
becomes a pure water broker. Due to the resulting equalisation of marginal costs overall 
production efficiency in market 1 and 2 is maximised and therefore aggregated profits rise 
compared to the autarky situation. Purchasing water resources from B at price pT = cB allows 
the less efficient utility A to extract the full rent of the additional profit induced by the 
increased efficiency. Similar to the trade regime in cases 1 and 2 of section 3.2.1 highest 
possible production efficiency can be achieved. However, due to the marginal cost pricing at the 
wholesale market the problem of double marginalisation can be totally removed. A therefore 
faces exactly the same maximisation problem as an independent monopolist with marginal 
costs cB und sets  B c p q p    ' 1 1 1 . Due to the non-existent double marginalisation the relevant 
retail price must be lower and welfare higher than in a trade regime where the more efficient 
utility B has some positive bargaining power. However, it is in general not clear whether p1 is 22 




4 Linear Analysis 
 
In order to illustrate the results derived for general demand functions in section 3.2.1 (where B 
has the entire bargaining power in the trade regime) more detailed, we use an example with 
linear demand and cost functions. However, using linear costs for both utilities excludes case 3 
because a less efficient utility A would never have any incentives to produce a positive amount 
of water in a trade regime since A’s constant marginal production costs (now denoted by cA) 
always exceed cB. Therefore our linear example analyses and compares competition and trade 
in cases 1 and 2. We define the inverse demand in market 1 as follows:  
 
1 1 bq k p         (20) 
 
Using equations (3), (4), (5), (13), (15), (17) and (20) we obtain explicit expressions for the 
equilibrium prices and production quantities in the two different regimes. We know from our 
general analysis that there are three possible states in the competition regime: case 1a and 
case 1b, where A stops own production and case 2, where A keeps its own production. The 
equilibrium will be in case 2 if and only if the resulting retail price p1 in market 1 exceeds 
marginal costs cA 
 










As mentioned above, in the trade regime one has to consider only one possible state: A does not 
produce a positive amount of water. However, one has to differentiate case 2b, the bend of the 
demand curve, from cases 1 and 2a. In case 2b B’s marginal cost curve cuts its marginal profit 
curve from trading activities in its vertical range. Hence for 2 / ) ( B A c k c    it is profit 
maximising for B to set A T c p  . To derive the relevant equilibrium values in cases 1 and 2a 
the slope of the demand curve for traded water has to be determined. Using equations (15) and 
(20) we get  ) 2 /( 1 / b p q T T     . Table 2 illustrates the relevant equilibrium values for both the 
competition and the trade regime. Additionally it shows the equilibrium values for a monopoly 
regime in order to create a benchmark case. 
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Table 2: Retail prices, quantities and access respectively trade prices 
 
Figure 3 illustrates and compares the above derived results regarding the retail price. 
The figure defines retail price p1 as a function of marginal costs cA in the monopoly, trade and 
competition regime. 
 




4.1 Trade versus Competition 
 
As mentioned above the roles of A and B change when moving from competition by access to 
trade. A acts in the trade regime as a downstream company, in the competition regime as an 
upstream company. For B the reverse holds. Figure 4 illustrates this fact. 
 
Figure 4: Market structure: trade versus competition 
 
The linear analysis allows us to extract more intuition of the general result stated in 
proposition 1. For case 1a we derived the result that p1 is the same for both the competition and 
trade regime. However, in the trade regime consumers are exclusively served by the 
downstream company A, in the competition regime by the downstream company B. Their 
relevant marginal costs correspond to the same level since  . 1 B T c a p    Since both downstream 
companies face isomorphic profit maximisation problems, in equilibrium p1 and q1 and 
therefore consumer rent correspond to the same level. And since water is only produced by the 
more efficient utility B, aggregate profits must be equal as well. We conclude that the resulting 
welfare is the same in both regimes. However, the distribution of the aggregate profits between 
A and B is different. With linear demand, the corresponding upstream monopolist receives two 
thirds of aggregate profits. Hence, the inefficient utility A is better off in the competition 
regime. In case 1b the retail and the access price in the competition regime are lower than in 
case 1a. Obviously A’s engagement must be higher than in case 1a. Similar to case 1a only the 
more efficient B produces. As stated in proposition 2 we can infer that in case 1b welfare is 
always higher in the competition regime.  
The result may change when moving to case 2. As stated in proposition 3 the retail 
price p1 is still lower under competition than under trade. The lower retail price is due to A’s 
engagement in market 1 which implies a higher overall production quantity in market 1 (see 
Table 2). Again, the lower retail price positively affects welfare in the competition regime. 24 
However, since cB < cA average production costs are higher with competition which negatively 
affects welfare. At high levels of c A where A’s production is still small, the price effect 
dominates. However, when the neighbouring water utilities’ cost differential becomes smaller, 
the production inefficiency effect becomes relatively more important since the price difference 
between competition and trade declines (see Figure 3). Our simulations in section 5 show that 
welfare is higher in the trade regime when cA is lower. How are profits distributed? With linear 
demand, the upstream monopolist skims two thirds of the aggregate profits in both regimes. In 
the trade regime B gets two thirds of aggregate profits. In the competition regime aggregate 
profits are lower due to lower productive efficiency. Obviously A is able to skim more than two 
thirds of aggregate profits because A also acts as a producer in the downstream market.  
 
4.2 Shifting the Bargaining Power 
 
The linear analysis can easily be extended to the trade regime in section 3.2.2 where the entire 
bargaining power is shifted to the less efficient utility A. Now, utility A can buy treated water 
at a trade price pT = cB. A stops own production completely and purchases the entire water from 
B since cA > pT. A therefore faces exactly the same maximisation problem as an independent 
monopolist with marginal costs cB. The retail price is therefore determined as 
follows: 2 / ) ( 1 B c k p   . Since k > cA > cB such retail price must be lower than the relevant 
retail prices in the competition regime. The relevant quantity q1 is given by  b c k q B 2 / ) ( 1   . 
Figure 5 illustrates the relevant retail prices.  
 
Figure 5: Retail price in market 1 (A has the entire bargaining power) 
 
S i n c e  t h e  e n t i r e  w a t e r  s o l d  i n  m a r k e t  1  i s  p r o d u c e d  a t  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  cB highest 
possible production efficiency can be achieved in the trade regime. And since the relevant retail 
price p1 is lower than in the competition regime and than in the trade regime where B has the 
entire bargaining power, welfare can be improved.  
 
4.3 Introducing Price Regulation 
 
In most European countries water supply is provided by public utilities or regulated private 
companies. In both cases it is assumable that water suppliers’ freedom to set prices is 
restricted. Up to this point the model does not consider any kind of regulation. One might 
wonder if the above derived results fundamentally change when price regulation is taken into 
account. Price regulation can basically be applied for access and retail prices. First we examine 
the effects of an access price regulation and then the effects of a retail price cap.  25 
  Traditional regulation theory suggests marginal cost pricing for access in order to 
maximise welfare. Since such a pricing regime describes a first best solution we use it as a 
benchmark. In our model we assumed no marginal costs of water transport and allocation. The 
regulator should therefore set a1 = 0. Again we analyse the effects of B’s entrance in market 1. 
Since  B d o e s  n o t  f a c e  a n y  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  o f  u s i n g  n e t w o r k  1 ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  d o u b l e  
marginalisation is removed. Competition in network 1 can be described as an ordinary Cournot 
duopoly competition model. The relevant retail price is illustrated in Figure 6:  
 
Figure 6: Retail price in market 1 (with 1st best regulated access price) 
 
The regulation of the access price increases the degree of competition in market 1 and 
therefore reduces the relevant retail price compared to unregulated competition and trade. 
Similar to the trade regime the less efficient utility A does not have any production incentives 
in cases 1a, 1b and 2a because only B produces a positive amount of water when 
2 / ) ( B A c k c   . Welfare is then the highest in the regulated access price regime. However, 
since A does not charge a variable access price, there is a hazard for inefficient market entry: A 
would enter market 1 even when cB > cA). But marginal cost pricing does not allow the 
incumbent to cover fixed network costs such as costs for investment and maintenance. If the 
incumbent cannot be compensated by subsidies, access prices are required to consider fixed 
costs. This can be realised by charging an additional lump sum fee to the market entrant or by 
charging a mark up over marginal costs. In practice, usually the latter alternative is chosen. In 
its guidance for the access price calculation the English water regulator Ofwat originally 
suggested three different methodologies: average accounting costs (AAC), long run marginal 
costs (LRMC) and the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) (see Ofwat 2002, p. 22). Based 
on the Water Act 2003 Ofwat applied a price formula which is a version of ECPR (see Conti 
2004, p. 12) 
However, introducing a mark up over short run marginal costs reduces the relative 
performance of the regulated access price regime. When a1 > 0, B faces marginal costs of access 
and reduces its engagement in market 1. The resulting retail price p1 would be higher than 
illustrated in Figure 6. To regulate access prices in practice, sufficient accounting data must be 
available and physical depreciation must be measured adequately. But due to asymmetric 
information an incumbent firm may be able to manipulate such data: While an incumbent itself 
is able to assess costs accurately, the regulator as an outsider cannot observe and verify them 
properly. In addition the regulation of access prices in the water industry is expected to be very 
complex and costly (see section 2.2). Henceforth water suppliers’ freedom to set access prices is 
significant and it is difficult to achieve the first best access price. However, as shown in section 
3.1 even in a “worst case scenario” where access price regulation is not applied at all, a 26 
vertically integrated water supplier opens its network to the competitor that produces with 
lower marginal costs. It is important to note, that an analogous result could be achieved using 
access price regulation by the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), which is also applied 
by Ofwat in the English and Welsh water market regulation (see Foellmi and Meister 2005, p. 
125). As in our model, market entry only happens if the incumbent’s competitor is more 
efficient. However, under ECPR there is no voluntary motivation to open the network since it 
indicates revenue neutrality for the incumbent.  
  Finally, consider the regulation of retail prices. Ex ante retail price regulation by price 
cap is applied for instance in England and Wales. The regulator fixes the retail price at 
1 p . 
Demand in market 1 is then given by  1 1 1 ) ( q p q  . In order to analyse the potential effects of 
regulation we assume that 
1 p  is below the equilibrium retail prices in both regimes. Using such 
a price cap implies that consumer surplus must be equal in both regimes. Regulation therefore 
withdraws the benefit of the competition regime described above. The only source of welfare 
differences can therefore be due to differences in productive efficiency. Obviously the 
introduction of the price cap in a trade regime does not change the overall productive efficiency. 
Again, in the relevant cases 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b only the more efficient utility B produces a 
positive amount of water. In contrast, the introduction of a price cap may change the 
productive efficiency under competition. Now, the less efficient supplier A faces lower 
production incentives in case 2a and 2b than in an unregulated model, since we assumed 
 1 4 / 3 p c k B   . A keeps its own production in the competition regime only when cA is below 
the relevant retail price in market 1. A reduction of the retail price due to regulation therefore 
reduces the less efficient utility’s production incentives. Hence the productive efficiency in the 
competition regime can be improved by the implementation of a price cap. However, as long as 
A c p  1 the less efficient utility A still produces a positive amount of water. Therefore 





In section 4.1 we indicated that welfare is higher in the trade regime when the cost differential 
between the two firms is small. With larger cost differences, welfare is higher in the 
unregulated competition regime or equal in both regimes. One may ask whether these results 
are robust when assuming a more general demand or increasing marginal costs. In this section 
we simulate the (unregulated) model of section 3 and perform some comparative statics. We 
allow for non-linear demand and increasing marginal costs of A. Demand is defined as 

1 1 bq k p   , where η determines the curvature of water demand, and A’s marginal costs as 27 
A A A q c c q C 1 0 ) ( '   .  B’s marginal costs cB are assumed to be linear. Since the relative 
performance of trade is stronger when A has the entire bargaining power we restrict our 
analysis to a situation where the more efficient utility has the bargain power. First we apply 
comparative statics by varying A’s marginal costs (see Table 3). We assume b = 1, η = 1, k = 12, 
c1 = 1 and cB = 2.  
 
Table 3: Varying the cost differential 
 
Note first that for c0  9.5 A decides in both regimes to stop own production and welfare 
is equal in both regimes (case 1a). For 9.5 > c0  9.273 we are in case 1b. We see that the 
welfare of the competition case is strictly higher than in the trade regime. As we decrease A’s 
marginal costs further, the welfare advantage of the competition regime begins to shrink 
because the inefficient utility increases its own production. For c0 smaller than 8 the productive 
inefficiency is so high such that welfare is higher under trade.  
 
Table 4: Varying the curvature of the demand curve 
 
Table 4 varies the curvature of the demand curve. We assume b = 1, k = 12, c0 = 8 c1 = 
1, cB = 2 and vary the curvature of the demand curve, which is described by η. In cases 1b and 2 
the retail price p1 is always lower in the competition regime than in the trade regime. The 
intuition from Ramsey pricing suggests that the positive welfare effect of lower prices should be 
stronger in the case of a more elastic demand (lower η). As Table 4 shows, this holds true in the 
numerical simulation. For elastic demand, competition works better whereas in the inelastic 
case trade prevails. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
Costs and tariffs of water supply differ significantly, even between adjacent water utilities. 
Mergers between water firms may be one approach to increasing the efficiency of water 
services and balancing the regional tariff levels. However, mergers are not always the best 
strategy. On the one hand, political restrictions on the municipal level might limit fundamental 
changes in organizational structures and related changes of ownership. On the other hand, 
they may hinder the use of economies of scope that occur when providing different network 28 
services within one local firm. We argued in Section 2.1 that differences in raw water qualities 
and the related treatment requirements tend to be a main source of cost differentials.  
Our model in Section 3 shows that an increase in overall production efficiency can be 
achieved without merging the organizations. Rather, competition in the market and 
cooperation by trade may be reached after networks are physically connected. Both competition 
and trade allow less efficient suppliers to reduce their own production and/or overcome their 
capacity constraints, while more efficient suppliers enhance production by raising their 
treatment facilities’ rate of capacity utilization. We showed that the increase in combined 
consumer and producer surplus is higher (lower) in the trade regime compared to competition 
when the cost differential between utilities is low (high). The optimal choice of the institutional 
framework, therefore, depends on the initial efficiency differential between neighboring 
utilities because there is interplay between the productive efficiency and the retail price effect. 
One might conjecture that the model of trade would be implemented anyway, as the 
relevant firms face incentives for trade and both may profit from a higher overall efficiency. 
However, most water utilities are currently monopolists, and tariffs depend on the relevant 
costs. Hence, incentives for organizational and structural changes tend to be low. Moreover, our 
analysis shows that a simple setup of voluntary trade and unregulated competition does not 
lead to the same results.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that both regimes’ performances can be improved. 
The competition model assumes a lower-bound benchmark case in which regulation does not 
exist. Of course, the regulation of the access price increases the relative performance of the 
competition regime because it reduces the problem of vertical foreclosure and double 
marginalization. A further extension is the regulation of retail prices. Introducing a price cap 
into the model improves the production efficiency in the competition regime (see Section 4.3). 
The trade regime’s relative performance can be improved by enhancing firm A’s bargaining 
power; again, the double marginalization problem of trade pricing is reduced.  
Although we designed our model to examine what we view as an important feature in 
the water industry, our analysis might also be applicable to other industries as well. In 
general, it applies to market structures (i) that are characterized by geographically separated 
natural monopolies and (ii) where access to the incumbent’s infrastructure by neighboring 
monopolies is possible. Examples are local network-based services. It is important to note that 
our model is not applicable to two-way networks such as railroads or industries for which 
customer utility depends on how many customers are connected to the network. This is the 
main difference of the present analysis to the existing network models of the 
telecommunications industry. 
Our model analyzed welfare effects of competition and trade in the piped water 
industry with a pure microeconomic analysis. However, in practice, it may be useful to consider 29 
additional political and legal aspects. Obviously, trade between utilities can be implemented 
much easier in practice than competition by common carriage. Profit-maximizing utilities have 
incentives to introduce voluntarily cross-border trade, whereas competition may need extensive 
and complex economic regulation. In contrast to competition, political resistance to trade would 
be minor. Besides political resistance, there is a wide range of legal barriers for competition in 
the water sector. In countries such as Germany or Switzerland, the principle of territorial 
exclusivity (Oertlichkeitsprinzip respectively Territorialprinzip) hinders the introduction of 
common carriage (see Andersen and Reichhard 2009, p. 29). Of course, trade between 
neighboring utilities is already practiced by existing water utilities in several countries. 
However, in most cases, trade is only used to balance peaks in demand; efficient spot water 
markets usually do not exist. One can infer that trade is particularly applied in the case of 
significant cost differentials. An extension of water trade or even the introduction of common 
carriage would lead to further welfare gains. However, trade does not occur because local water 
suppliers are often not profit-oriented, as they are part of the public authority. Furthermore, 
common carriage is not applied due to the legal framework. 30 
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Table 1: Different Marginal Cost Scenarios 
 
   Case 1a 
1 ˆ ) 0 ( ' p CA   
Case 1b 
1 ˆ ) 0 ( ' p CA   
Case 2a 
T A p C p ˆ ) 0 ( ' ˆ1  
 
Case 2b 
T A p C ˆ ) 0 ( '   
Case 3 
T A p C ˆ ) 0 ( '   
Trade  qA = 0  qA = 0  qA > 0 
Competition  q1A = 0  q1A > 0  q1A > 0 
 41 
Table 2: Retail prices, quantities and access respectively trade prices 
 
 P 1 q 1 q 1A q 1B a 1 or pT 
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Table 3: Varying the cost differential 
 
 Trade  Competition  WComp 
(WTrade/100) 
c0 p 1Trade p T q 1Trade W Trade p 1Comp q 1AComp q 1Comp W Comp  
7.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  8.852  0.926  3.148  21.468 98.1 
7.5  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  8.944  0.722  3.056  21.654 99.0 
8.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  9.037  0.519  2.963  21.994  100.5 
8.5  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  9.130  0.315  2.871  22.488  102.8 
9.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  9.222  0.111  2.778  23.136  105.8 
9.273  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  9.273  0.000  2.727  23.554  107.8 
9.5  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875  9.500  0.000  2.500  21.875  100.0 43 
Table 4: Varying the curvature of the demand curve 
 
 Trade  Competition  WComp 
(WTrade/10
0) 
η p 1Trade p T q 1Trade W Trade p 1Comp q 1AComp q 1Comp W Comp  
0.6  8.094 5.750 9.689  73.233 8.003 0.002  10.068  75.511  103.1 
0.7  8.540 6.118 5.890  46.915 8.357 0.254 6.341  48.261  102.9 
0.8  8.914 6.444 4.091  33.894 8.631 0.397 4.565  34.646  102.2 
0.9  9.230 6.737 3.102  26.499 8.852 0.475 3.576  26.869  101.4 
1.0  9.500 7.000 2.500  21.875 9.037 0.519 2.963  21.994  100.5 
1.1  9.732 7.238 2.105  18.776 9.196 0.542 2.553  18.725  99.7 
1.2  9.934 7.455 1.831  16.588 9.335 0.553 2.263  16.415  99.0 
1.3  10.110 7.652 1.632  14.979 9.459 0.559 2.049  14.716  98.2 
1.4  10.264 7.833 1.483  13.757 9.571 0.560 1.885  13.424  97.6 
1.5  10.400 8.000 1.368  12.804 9.672 0.560 1.756  12.415  97.0 
 